Design of a fault-tolerant control system for a self-balancing two-wheel vehicle by Matějásko, Michal
VYSOKÉ UČENÍ TECHNICKÉ V BRNĚ
BRNO UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
FAKULTA STROJNÍHO INŽENÝRSTVÍ
ÚSTAV MECHANIKY TĚLES, MECHATRONIKY A
BIOMECHANIKY
FACULTY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING
INSTITUTE OF SOLID MECHANICS, MECHATRONICS AND
BIOMECHANICS
DESIGN OF A FAULT-TOLERANT CONTROL
SYSTEM FOR A SELF-BALANCING TWO-WHEEL
VEHICLE
NÁVRH BEZPEČNÉHO ŘÍDICÍHO SYSTÉMU PRO DVOUKOLOVÉ BALANCUJÍCÍ VOZIDLO
DIPLOMOVÁ PRÁCE
MASTER'S THESIS
AUTOR PRÁCE Bc. MICHAL MATĚJÁSKO
AUTHOR
VEDOUCÍ PRÁCE doc. Ing. ROBERT GREPL, Ph.D.
SUPERVISOR
BRNO 2015

Vysoké učení technické v Brně, Fakulta strojního inženýrství
Ústav mechaniky těles, mechatroniky a biomechaniky
Akademický rok: 2014/2015
ZADÁNÍ DIPLOMOVÉ PRÁCE
student(ka): Bc. Michal Matějásko
který/která studuje v magisterském navazujícím studijním programu
obor: Mechatronika (3906T001) 
Ředitel ústavu Vám v souladu se zákonem č.111/1998 o vysokých školách a se Studijním a
zkušebním řádem VUT v Brně určuje následující téma diplomové práce:
Návrh bezpečného řídicího systému pro dvoukolové balancující vozidlo
v anglickém jazyce:
Design of a fault-tolerant control system for a self-balancing two-wheel
vehicle
Stručná charakteristika problematiky úkolu:
Tato práce se bude zabývat návrhem, implementací a testováním algoritmů pro bezpečný provoz
dvoukolového nestabilního balancujícího vozidla. Práce navazuje na studentský projekt dokončený
v r. 2011 a bude tedy realizována na reálném vozidle. Cílem řídicího algoritmu je zajistit
stabilizaci a bezpečné zastavení vozidla v případě poruchy sensorů, řídicí jednotky nebo
nevhodného zásahu uživatele. Tohoto cíle je třeba dosáhnout vhodnou kombinací hardwarového a
softwarového návrhu. Součástí práce bude testování nově vytvořené reálné řídicí jednotky pomocí
HIL simulace včetně tvorby adekvátního modelu soustavy. Konkrétní návrh elektroniky (řídicí,
výkonové i bezpečnostní) je předmětem řešení jiné diplomové práce. Celý projekt je řešen v týmu.
Cíle diplomové práce:
1) Proveďte detailní analýzu možného výskytu poruch a nestandardních událostí při provozu
vozidla, vyhodnoťte riziko metodikou FMEA a navrhněte opatření pro snížení rizik.
2) Navrhněte konkrétní architekturu řídicí jednotky s dvěma nezávislými CPU, redundantní
sensorikou a systémem diagnostiky, vyhodnocení a přepínání platných výstupů pro výkonovou
elektroniku. Vytvořte simulanční model vytvořené řídicí jednotky a vlastnosti demonstrujte sérií
testů.
3) Implementujte navržené řízení do reálné řídicí elektroniky. Použijte nástroje pro automatické
generování kódu.
4) Vytvořte model soustavy a odhadněte jeho parametry. Volte přitom co nejjednodušší model,
tak, aby byl schopen generovat požadovaný výstupy ze sensorů pro HIL simulaci.
5) Pomocí RT hardwaru dSPACE proveďte HIL simulaci reálné řídicí elektroniky. Na sérii testů,
při kterých budete simulovat vybrané poruchy, demonstrujte vlastnosti vytvořené řídicí jednotky.
Seznam odborné literatury:
[1] Zouhar: Návrh, konstrukce, řízení a elektroniky pro nestabilní balancující vozidlo, DP VUT
FSI, 2011
[2] Štěpánek: Identifikace systému, sensorika a implementace řídicího algoritmu pro nestabilní
balancující vozidlo, DP VUT FSI, 2011
[3] Nelles: Nonlinear System Identification, Springer 2001
[4] Jung, L.: System Identification, 2009
[5] Valášek, M.: Mechatronika, Vydavatelství ČVUT 1995
Vedoucí diplomové práce: doc. Ing. Robert Grepl, Ph.D.
Termín odevzdání diplomové práce je stanoven časovým plánem akademického roku 2014/2015.
V Brně, dne 27.11.2014
L.S.
_______________________________ _______________________________
prof. Ing. Jindřich Petruška, CSc. doc. Ing. Jaroslav Katolický, Ph.D.
Ředitel ústavu Děkan fakulty
Abstrakt
Tato pra´ce se zaby´va´ na´vrhem nove´ho rˇ´ıd´ıc´ıho syste´mu, odolne´ho proti chyba´m,
pro nestabiln´ı samo-balancuj´ıc´ı dvoukolove´ vozidlo typu Segway. Pu˚vodn´ı syste´m
vozidla je podroben analy´ze rizikovosti jeho soucˇa´st´ı a na za´kladeˇ vy´sledk˚u jsou
navrzˇena opatrˇen´ı pro zvy´sˇen´ı jeho bezpecˇnosti. Je navrzˇena nova´ topologie
rˇ´ıd´ıc´ıho syste´mu obsahuj´ıc´ı dveˇ samostatne´ rˇ´ıd´ıc´ı jednotky, redundantn´ı senzoriku
a voter. Pro rˇ´ıd´ıc´ı jednotky byl vyvinut software obsahuj´ıc´ı bezpecˇnostn´ı algoritmy
a mechanismy prˇep´ına´n´ı kontroln´ıch vy´stup˚u. V pra´ci jsou take´ prˇedstaveny dva
matematicke´ modely vozidla r˚uzne´ slozˇitosti, ktere´ jsou na´sledneˇ vyuzˇity prˇi HIL
testova´n´ı noveˇ navrzˇene´ho syste´mu. Cely´ na´vrh byl proveden s vyuzˇit´ım na´stroj˚u
pro Rapid Control Prototyping.
Kl´ıcˇova´ slova
samo-balancuj´ıc´ı vozidlo, Segway, Rapid Control Prototyping, HIL, rˇ´ıd´ıc´ı syste´m,
redundance, fault detection, FMEA
Abstract
This thesis deals with the design of a new fault-tolerant control system for a
self-balancing two-wheel vehicle of the Segway type. The original vehicle system
is subject to a risk analysis of its components. Based on the results, new safety
measures are suggested for the system. A new control system topology is designed,
consisting of two independent control units, redundant sensors and a voter. Software
for the control units integrating fault-detection algorithms and a control outputs
switching mechanism has been developed. Two mathematical models of different
complexities for the vehicle are presented and then used in HIL testing of the new
control system. The whole design of the system was done using Rapid Control
Prototyping tools.
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self-balancing vehicle, Segway, Rapid Control Prototyping, HIL, control system,
redundancy, fault detection, FMEA
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1 Introduction
When developing a new means of transport, the most important issue is to ensure
passenger safety. These systems are usually complicated, and the biggest problem to
solve is to connect several parts in a way that ensures flawless system performance.
As technology advances, engineers are facing many new challenges in fulfilling
increasing demands on not only safety, but also reliability and comfort.
Recently there has been an increase in the popularity of unconventional means of
personal transport, including the Segway. The Segway – invented by the company
of the same name - is an example of a two-wheeled self-balancing vehicle made
to transport a single passenger. This vehicle was the first to offer passengers an
innovative and attractive means of transport at a reasonable price.
Vehicles such as the Segway are complex mechatronic systems comprised of a
mechanical body, motors, sensors, and power and control electronics. Connecting
these parts in a way that ensures the system’s safe and reliable operation is not a
simple task.
This thesis introduces the development of a safe control system solution for
our self-balancing two-wheel vehicle. It builds on a previous student project and
deals with the original vehicle system risk analysis, the design of a new control
system, software implementation into real electronics and finally the testing of the
new system. This thesis is made in cooperation with Bc. Michal Bastl, who focuses
on the design of new, safer electronics.
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2 Original Vehicle
A few years ago, a vehicle inspired by the Segway was developed in our Mechatronics
Laboratory (MechLab) [1] by a group of students [2][3][4]. Although the vehicle was
fully functional, it had several minor or major safety insufficiencies, which could
jeopardize the passenger.
The vehicle is meant to serve as a real model at our Mechatronics Laboratory
on which students can work and learn. It is also intended to be an illustration of
what kind of projects can students participate on.
2.1 Condition of the Vehicle
Together with Bc. Michal Bastl we have started to work on operational vehicle
comprised of:
• A mechanical body
• DC geared motors
• Power electronics
• An Electronic Control Unit (ECU)
• Control software
• A display showing ride information
The relatively durable mechanical body of the vehicle (fig.:2.1) is made of an
aluminium alloy. From a mechanical properties point of view, the parts are slightly
oversized and therefore able to withstand the load required.
The vehicle is actuated by two DC motors GR 80x80 [5] equipped with planetary
gears of a 9:1 gear ratio. The power of these two motors is fully sufficient to run the
vehicle on paved surfaces. To supply the motors, three 12V batteries, connected in
series, are used. The batteries are also the source of energy for all the electronics
on the vehicle.
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2.1: Condition of the Vehicle
Figure 2.1: The Hummer vehicle (taken from [2])
A potentiometer connected with a handlebar in the axis of its rotation provides
a signal for turning the vehicle, so the vehicle can be turned by the passenger. The
handlebar is also height-adjustable, thus increasing user comfort.
The motors are controlled by custom-designed power electronics [2]. On the
printed circuit board (PCB) of the power electronics, there is a PIC microcontroller,
which processes control signals from the ECU. According to the control signals, it
produces a pulse-width modulated (PWM) signal to switch power transistors in the
H-Bridge connection. On the PCB there are also transistor drivers, local power
references and a LEM current sensor.
13
2.2: Original Control Software of the Vehicle
In addition, the custom-designed ECU is based on the dsPIC33FJ128MC
microcontroller [6] made by Microchip. The ECU processes signals from four
analogue sensors - the accelerometer (acc), tilt angular velocity sensor (gyro), gyro
to sense turning angular velocity and the handlebar potentiometer - and it generates
the control signals for the power electronics.
2.2 Original Control Software of the Vehicle
The original control software of the vehicle was developed by using Rapid Control
Prototyping methods. The program was created in Simulink [7], which is a part of
MATLAB, developed by MathWorks [8]. Simulink is a graphical programming and
modelling environment, where programs are made by connecting graphical blocks
with wires. In the blocks there are prearranged mathematical functions and their
parameters are passed by the wires. The program is then interpreted to the user as
a block scheme/model.
The final C-code loaded into the microcontroller of the ECU was automatically
generated from the program in Simulink.
Figure 2.2: The original control program in Simulink
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2.2: Original Control Software of the Vehicle
In figure 2.2 the original control program in Simulink is shown. The sensor
signals of the acc and gyros are processed in the Sensor signals to angles block. At
first, values from the Analog-to-Digital converter (ADC) are converted to real units,
and then the tilt angle of the vehicle is calculated using the Complementary filter
(see 2.2.1). Turning angular velocity is also calculated there.
The calculated values are then inputs of the PID tilt regulator and the P turning
regulator respectively. However, the turning angular velocity is not used in the
regulator.
In the Potentiometer signal processing block, there is a potentiometer signal
filter and the desired turning angular velocity is calculated.
The H-Bridge controller block processes produced duty cycles from the
regulators. It contains functions to calculate the desired duty cycle and direction
(control signals) for both motors. There is also a logic gate to switch off the duty
cycles production.
The Sensor check block contains limit check algorithms. The inputs are values
from the acc and gyro, and calculated tilt angle. There are specified limits for
the values of these three inputs. Exceeding any of the limits leads to a change in
the logical value output. This will then trigger the duty cycle switching logic gate
mentioned in the paragraph above.
2.2.1 Complementary Filter
The Complementary Filter (CF) is a tool that eliminates partial insufficiencies of
the acc and gyro sensors while computing the tilt angle of the vehicle. The CF
combines signals from both sensors and gives each sensor different influence in the
calculation. The difference equation of CF is the following:
ϕk = (1− c)(ϕk−1 + ϕ˙gyroTs) + cϕacc (2.1)
The constant c is a weight specifying the influence of values, ϕgyro is angular
velocity from gyro, ϕacc is the angle from acc and Ts is the sample time.
15
2.3: Possible Faults During the Vehicle Operation
2.3 Possible Faults During the Vehicle Operation
As mentioned before, the vehicle has several insufficiencies. These include:
• No capacitors on the power electronics to reduce back EMF
• Easily detachable cables
• Non-redundant sensors
• Only one ECU
• Lack of safety algorithms
The missing capacity on the power electronics was a significant issue. Several
pieces of the power electronic were destroyed during vehicle operation due to this
issue. Some pieces were also damaged while the vehicle was turned off and dragged.
The easily detachable cables might also cause a serious failure during vehicle
activity. Furthermore, there were inadequate connectors for signal cables, especially
on the ECU PCB (see fig.:2.3).
Figure 2.3: PCB of the original ECU
Considering that none of the components in the original system were backed
up, and that the software has insufficient safety algorithms, any minor failure during
the vehicle operation might have serious consequences.
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3 Risks Assessment and Goals
Specification
To be able to objectively assess the risk of components on the original vehicle
system and appropriately design safety measures, it was necessary to apply some
standardized and commonly used method. There are many different methods, each
with their pros and cons.
3.1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
One of those methods is FMEA. In chapter 4.3 of [9] it is stated: ”The FMEA
is a formalized method to consider all components, their functions, failure modes
and causal system failures. The method was developed in 1960s and used by NASA
for the Apollo project, later for aerospace and nuclear power stations. Now it is a
standard method also in the automotive industry.”
In this method, the examined system is analysed by individual parts. In every
part all of the possible failures, causes and effects on the system are considered.
This is often extended by taking the probability of the failure into consideration.
The standard output of FMEA is a table.
The degree of risk of particular failure is given by Failure Risk Priority Number
(FRPN).
FRPN = A×B × E (3.1)
Where:
• A: probability of failure occurrence
• B: effects on the system
• E: detection rate
17
3.2: Our FMEA
To determine the failure risk of a component, we must first specify the ranking
numbers A, B and E. These numbers are not standardised in general, however
accepted exemplars exist within certain industries. The most common range used
for these numbers is from 1 to 10. Examples of number meaning might be found in
[9], tables 4.3 and 4.4.
3.2 Our FMEA
In order to obtain a better insight to the problem, we performed our own FMEA. We
adjusted the FMEA methodology to better suit our needs and to be appropriately
applicable to our system.
At first, we needed to specify the FRPN ranking numbers. We decided to
simplify the common range of 1 - 10 to use only 1, 3, 6 and 10. The coefficients and
their meanings are stated in table 3.1.
A 1 Very low probability of occurrence
3 Low probability - we know how it may happen
6 High probability - we have encountered this fault before
10 This fault will certainly happen in the vehicle’s lifetime
B 1 Has no influence on ride quality
3 Reduced comfort of ride
6 Possible danger to passenger
10 High danger - vehicle uncontrollable
E 1 Immediate detection
3 Detection up to 0.1s
6 Detection in seconds and more
10 Cannot detect
Table 3.1: Used FRPN ranking numbers
Analysis was performed on the original state of the vehicle system, keeping in
mind that we consider the issues with insufficient connectors and power electronics
to already be solved.
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3.2: Our FMEA
Component Fault Effects
Applied
measures
A B E FRPN
ACC
Total sensor
failure
Vehicle
uncontrollable
min.;max. 6 10 1 60
Wrong
values
Vehicle
uncontrollable
min.;max. 3 6 6 108
Gyro
(tilt)
Total sensor
failure
Vehicle
uncontrollable
min.;max. 6 10 1 60
Wrong
values
Vehicle
uncontrollable
min.;max. 3 6 6 108
Gyro
(turning)
Total sensor
failure
No feedback - 6 1 10 60
Wrong
values
Bad feedback - 3 1 10 30
LEM
Sensor
failure
No
measurement
- 6 1 10 60
Wrong
measurements
- 6 1 10 60
Potentio-
meter
Total sensor
failure
Cannot turn - 10 3 6 180
Wrong
values
Inaccurate
turning
- 10 3 6 180
Battery Total failure
No energy
for all
components
- 3 10 10 300
Low charge
Motors
losing power
Charge
signalization
10 6 1 60
Voltage
references
15V failure
Transistors
on H-B don’t
work
- 3 10 10 300
5V failure
Nothing is
working
- 3 10 10 300
ECU
Many
possible
things
Always
critical
- 3 10 10 300
Table 3.2: Customized FMEA of the original vehicle (shortened)
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3.2: Our FMEA
Component Fault Effects
New applied
measures
A B E FRPN
ACC
Total sensor
failure
Vehicle
uncontrollable
min.; max.;
grad.;
6 1 1 6
Wrong
values
Vehicle
uncontrollable
redundant
sensor
3 3 3 27
Gyro
(tilt)
Total sensor
failure
Vehicle
uncontrollable
min.; max.;
grad.;
6 1 1 6
Wrong
values
Vehicle
uncontrollable
redundant
sensor
3 3 3 27
Gyro
(turning)
Total sensor
failure
None
min.; max.;
grad.;
6 1 1 6
Wrong
values
None
redundant
sensor
3 1 3 9
LEM
Sensor
failure
No
measurement
Redundant
summing
sensor
6 1 1 6
Wrong
measurements
6 1 1 6
Potentio-
meter
Total sensor
failure
Cannot turn min.; max.; 10 1 1 10
Wrong
values
Inaccurate
turning
redundant
sensor
10 3 3 90
Battery Total failure
No energy
for all
components
- 3 10 10 300
Low charge
Motors
losing power
Charge
signalization;
ECU check
10 1 1 10
Voltage
references
15V failure
Transistors
on H-B don’t
work
redundancy 3 6 3 54
5V failure
Nothing is
working
redundancy 3 3 1 9
ECU
Many
possible
things
Always
critical
redundancy;
safety
algorithms
3 1 1 3
Table 3.3: Customized FMEA with measures applied to the system (shortened)
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3.2: Our FMEA
The results of the analysis in table 3.2 suggest that the most critical component
of the vehicle is the battery (considering all three batteries as one). Upon sudden
battery failure (e.g. mechanical damage) the system becomes inoperable and the
consequences may be severe. It is similar with the 5V voltage reference, which is the
only one on the vehicle. In case of its failure, the ECU would lose its power source
and would therefore stop working. In both cases the system would lose any reaction
capability.
Furthermore, the analysis shows the riskiness of ECU failure, which is not
backed up. The same problem is encountered with the 15V voltage reference for
transistor drivers. Sensors are critical too, despite the fact that even in some types
of failure, the ECU would be at least able to switch off duty cycle generation.
However, this may happen at high velocity so the issue remains severe. On the
other hand, the least risk is found in the LEM sensor and turning gyro. This is
mainly because their outputs are not actively used in the control.
Based on this analysis we have suggested measures to increase system safety.
A new analysis was performed on the imaginary system on which we assume those
measures as already applied (table 3.3). We also assume that we are actively using
all of the components. Notice that only the applied measures, ranking numbers and
FRPM are changed.
We achieved a reduction of FRPN for acc and gyros by checking the gradient
of data values and by adding a redundant sensor. Gradient checking also allows the
control to react much earlier compared with limit checking only.
Adding the limit checking and redundant sensor for the potentiometer reduced
the FRPN of its total failure. However, these measures influence the FRPN far less
in case where failure is based on wrong values. This is caused by the fact that in
general the quality of potentiometers reduces over time.
The most significant reduction of FRPN was seen in the ECU and voltage
references. Due to the fact that these components are essential in the vehicle system,
the only way to protect the system is to at least double them.
Unfortunately there was no change in battery failure risk. Adding a redundant
battery is not an option and it is therefore crucial to protect the battery from
21
3.3: Desired State of the Vehicle
mechanical damage as much as possible.
Our FMEA is somewhat simplified - to perform a proper system analysis, we
would have to go into much more detail. However, this is not the goal of this thesis.
The main reason for the analysis was to have a better insight into the system and to
expose its possible weaknesses. The complete FMEA is enclosed in electronic form.
3.3 Desired State of the Vehicle
The analysis above highlights the safety insufficiencies of the original system. It not
only demonstrates that the essential components are not backed up and that there
are serious problems with the electronics; but also that the lack of safety algorithms
make the operation of the vehicle with the original system dangerous.
In order to use the vehicle as intended, a new system has to be developed.
Together with Bc. Michal Bastl, we will attempt to solve this issue in our theses.
The required state of the new vehicle system should meet the following criteria:
• That dragging the turned-off vehicle will not damage the electronics
• That essential parts of the system will be backed up
• That the failure of one component will not jeopardize the passenger
• That the system will recognize a case of failure and will stop the vehicle
• That there will not be a risk of unintentional cable unplugging
22
4 Design of the New Vehicle
System
FMEA pointed out the system’s weaknesses. With the results, desired state and
assignment of the thesis in mind, the new system design must fulfil the following:
• Original mechanical body, motors and battery will be used
• New power electronics will be designed
• Power distribution will be redesigned
• Robust connectors and cables will be used
• New control system topology will be designed
• Essential components will be backed up
• New PCBs for the designed system will be created
• Safety and fault detection algorithms will be developed
• The designed system will be implemented on real electronics
• A simple mathematical model of the vehicle will be created
• HIL simulation of the new system will be performed
• The new system will be designed using Rapid Control Prototyping tools
• The design and development should be made as simple as possible
Accomplishing the above stated items should distinctly reduce the possibility
of vehicle malfunction. In case of any component failure, the new control system
should not jeopardize the passenger. The design of new and reliable electronics is
the subject of Bc. Michal Bastl’s thesis.
In the following sections, the new system design, its components and its
functionality are described.
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4.1: Control System Structure and Properties
4.1 Control System Structure and Properties
The first task was to design a new system topology which would fulfil all the
requirements of the project.
It was clear from the beginning that the new system could not rely on just one
ECU, but that more ECUs would be needed. However, in such a case it is important
to develop a reliable switching system of control outputs from the ECUs applied to
power electronics. In chapter 18 of [9] it is stated that the standard approach to
using multiple ECUs is to connect them to a fast switching mechanism called Voter.
The new system should also be galvanically isolated and each ECU should be
connected to only one redundant sensor of the type. When using multiple ECUs
there is a need for information interchange to take place. Therefore, a suitable bus
needs to be used in the system.
In our case, using two or three control units was envisaged. Each option has its
advantages and disadvantages.
The advantages and disadvantages of using three control units are:
+ Simple recognition of a malfunction (voter compares the control outputs of
the ECUs - the correct outputs outvote the wrong outputs)
+ High redundancy
– Complicated communication protocol among ECUs
– Many components = higher energy consumption
– More complicated voter logic
The advantages and disadvantages of using two control units are:
+ Simple communication between ECUs
+ Less components
+ Simple voter logic
– More complex fault detection mechanisms than voting
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After considering the advantages and disadvantages of both concepts, we
concluded that we are able to design the system to be both sufficiently safe and
reliable using only two ECUs. The reason for this choice is the goal of making the
design as simple as possible.
Therefore, the designed control system consists of two control units, each
connected to one redundant sensor of the type and of a voter. The voter provides
the physical connection of the control outputs from ECUs with power electronics,
and fast switching between which outputs are applied and which are not. All
subsystems are galvanically isolated to prevent any electrical malfunction from
spreading through the system.
The proposed topology of the control system is shown in figure 4.1. A detailed
description of its functionality can be found in section 4.5.
This system should be able to safely react to sensor malfunction, miscalculations
of an ECU and total failure of an ECU.
Figure 4.1: Scheme of the proposed control system with two ECUs and voter
25
4.2: Sensors Selection
4.2 Sensors Selection
An accelerometer (acc) and angular rate (gyro) sensor are needed to determine
the tilt angle. Unlike the situation a few years ago when the original vehicle was
developed, enhanced sensors are now available. We replaced the three original
analogue sensors with one Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) - IMU is an integrated
circuit which contains an acc, a gyro sensor and a magnetometer. The sensors
inside are made by MEMS technology [10]. We chose the MPU-9150 IMU from the
Invensense company [11].
The MPU-9150 contains:
• A Tri-Axis acc with adjustable ranges of ±2g, ±4g, ±8g, and ±16g
• A Tri-Axis gyro with adjustable ranges of ±250, ±500, ±1000, and ±2000 dps
• A Tri-Axis magnetometer with ±1200µT sensitivity
• An I2C serial interface with speeds of up to 400kHz
• A Digital Motion Processor
Figure 4.2: PCB with MPU-9150 (taken from [12])
Thanks to the sensors inside, this IMU is capable of determining its absolute
orientation, which may be utilized in further system improvements. It also contains
several useful functions such as programmable low-pass filter for sensor data.
Everything is accessible and easy to set via the serial interface.
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The IMU was bought pre-assembled on the PCB as shown in figure 4.2. The
PCB contains the necessary capacitors and pull-up resistors, on I2C interface lines,
for its operation.
The original (and no longer convenient) potentiometer was replaced by a new
model. We chose the 91R1A−R22−B13L potentiometer with 5kΩ resistance [13].
The potentiometer is made of a conductive plastic material and it has a linear output
voltage characteristic. Its shaft is 6mm in diameter.
4.3 ECU Platform Selection
For ECU realization the dsPIC33EP512MU810 microcontroller from Michrochip [14]
was chosen. The main criteria for this choice was the support of Microchip toolbox
for C-code generation from Simulink, its wide support of various communication
buses and also that this type of microcontroller was already used on some projects
at MechLab.
The parameters of the microcontroller that are important to our design are:
• CPU speed up to 70 MIPS
• 83 I/O pins
• Up to 7 PWM pairs
• Rich peripheral equipment
• 2×I2C; 4×UART; 4×SPI
This microcontroller is also suitable for further system enhancements in the
future.
4.4 Voter Selection
We decided to solve the problem of switching the control outputs from ECUs for
the power electronics by using a programmable logic chip. There are several options
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to choose from for these types of chip: they are programmable array logic (PAL)
devices, field-programmable gate array (FPGA) chips and complex programmable
logic devices (CPLD). There are many differences between these devices. Since PAL
devices are an already outdated technology with limited capabilities, we made our
choice from the two remaining types.
We decided to use CPLD mainly because, compared to FPGA, the devices have
a non-volatile memory. This is very important for our application as we need the
circuit to operate immediately after switching on. With FPGA there is a need to
load the program from external memory first, which takes some time.
Figure 4.3: The Cool Runner II kit with CPLD chip (taken from [15]) used in the
development
The Cool Runner II Starter Kit from Xilinx company (fig.: 4.3) was used in the
development. This kit was already at our disposal in the laboratory. The operational
scheme and description of the program inside the voter is in section 4.5. The design
of the voter’s final platform, using the same chip, is the subject of Bc. Michal Bastl’s
thesis.
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4.5 System Functionality
Together with the system topology design, it was necessary to consider how the new
system will react to possible faults. This section will describe what this new control
system is checking, what mechanisms it contains and how it reacts. A detailed
description of algorithms, which ensure this functionality, is in chapter 5.
As can be seen in figure 4.1, the new control system has two independent parts.
Both ECUs are active in the vehicle operation, and the control outputs of both
units are connected to the voter. Each ECU processes sensor data, checks them and
exchanges information with the second ECU via a bus.
4.5.1 ECU Functionality
Within each ECU there are several sub-processes implemented. These are:
• Vehicle control
• Fault Detection
• Bus communication
• Check signal generation
From the Tri-Axis acc and gyro inside the IMU, we use only one axis of each
- the axis that provides information about the vehicle tilt angle. Both ECUs gain
the signal from one potentiometer simultaneously.
The fault detection algorithms ensure the following:
• Limit checking of the acc, gyro and potentiometer values
• Gradient checking of the acc and gyro values
• New acc and gyro data arrival check
• Bus functionality check
• Comparing values sent between ECUs
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It is important to determine what data is necessary to interchange between the
ECUs and what bus is suitable for it. We can say that the ECUs should agree on
the control of the vehicle; i.e. they should produce the same control outputs. It is
also necessary, that in a case of failure on the side of an ECU, that another ECU
receives the failure information and can react according to the situation.
Based on this reasoning, we concluded that for our purposes the UART is a
suitable bus through which the ECUs should interchange information about:
• Computed duty cycles for both motors
• Whether and what fault an ECU registers
4.5.2 Voter Functionality
An important role in the switching of control outputs is played by the check signal
mentioned previously. It is a software-generated pulse signal on a digital output pin
(not using a PWM peripheral) of both ECUs connected to the voter. Inside the
voter there is a finite-state machine, shown in fig.: 4.4.
Figure 4.4: The simplified scheme of the state machine program inside the voter
The pulse check signal (in the scheme the transition conditions are called as
SWP_1 and SWP_2 respectively) serves as an indicator of ECU functionality. When the
signal changes its logic value, it indicates that program inside the ECU is running and
that the voter should not switch the outputs used. Once the signal stops changing
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its value (either because of an ECU program malfunction or because it was stopped
intentionally), the voter switches the output control values to the ones incoming
from the second ECU. If both the signals stop, the voter disconnects both units
from the power electronics and the system needs to be restarted. The development
of the voter program is the goal of Bc. Michal Bastl’s thesis.
4.5.3 System Reactions to Fault Events
Many failures may occur during the vehicle operation. The fault detection
algorithms (section 5.5) are able to recognize the following types of malfunction:
a) Sensor malfunction: May be caused by values crossing the allowed absolute
limit or allowed gradient, sensor output saturation or eventually by sensor
communication failure.
Reaction: The ECU checks the state of the second ECU. If the second ECU
doesn’t report an error, the first one shuts down the check signal, thereupon
the voter switches the applied control outputs to the outputs from the second
ECU. The first ECU sends the information about the fault to the second ECU
which stops the vehicle. In the event of the second ECU reporting a fault as
well as the first ECU, both units will start to stop the vehicle. The check signal
remains active at both ECUs until the vehicle is stopped. In both cases the
check signal shuts down when the vehicle is stopped and the voter disconnects
both ECUs from the power electronics.
b) Different duty cycle calculations: This means that the ECUs don’t agree on
the control outputs, while neither recognises an error. The cause of this type
of fault may be a computational error or a slow drift of sensor values (within
the allowed limits). This is detected by the information interchange.
Reaction: Regarding this type of fault it is difficult to determine which ECU
has a problem and which hasn’t. The ECUs signalise the fault to each other
and both start to stop the vehicle. When this is done, they shut down the
check signal.
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c) Bus malfunction: The bus is essential for the system to operate. This fault can
by caused by mechanical damage to the bus lines, by an isolator malfunction
(the bus has to be galvanically isolated as well) or by a ECU peripheral
malfunction.
Reaction: Due to the loss of communication, both ECUs start stopping the
vehicle. Again, after this is done, the check signal is shut down.
d) Total ECU failure: When an ECU fails to operate, the check signal stops
being generated and the communication between ECUs fail.
Reaction: The voter immediately switches the output to the second one. The
second ECU recognizes the communication failure and stops the vehicle, before
shutting down its check signal.
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The software for ECUs was created using Rapid Control Prototyping tools. These
tools allow the developer to quickly generate production code from a high level
environment, in which many mathematic and logical functions are prearranged, and
to perform tests of the final platform. This makes the development of large projects
much faster and easier than the usual approach of manually writing the code.
The Simulink, in particular The MPLAB Device Blocks for Simulink [16]
toolbox, was used in developing the software. This toolbox is produced by
Microchip as a direct support for the C-code generation for its dsPIC30 and dsPIC33
microcontrollers. It contains blocks (functions) that take care of the configuration
settings of the microcontroller, the peripheral setting and usage and also provides
an option to use the developer’s own written C-code.
To compile the generated C-code for the microcontroller, the XC16 compiler
from Microchip was used. The MPLAB X IDE [17] was used to check the generated
code and to load it into the microcontrollers.
All the software used in this project is enclosed electronically on a CD with
the thesis. The picture of the software for the ECUs, developed in Simulink, can be
found in appendix, fig.: A.1.
5.1 Program Structure
An important part in the development of the new control system was to create ECU
software capable of providing the requested functionality of the system. The created
program is divided into these parts:
• Microcontroller setting and initialisation of peripherals
• Sensor data readings
• Fault detection and Calibration
• Control
• Software check signal generator
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• UART communication
Figure 5.1: Scheme of the ECU program structure
In figure 5.1 the simplified block scheme of important ECU program parts,
including data flows, is shown. These program parts are briefly described below. A
detailed description will then be stated in following sections.
It can be seen in the picture, that sensor data are inputs for DELTA and Noise
detection and Fault Detection and Calibration. As mentioned previously, there is
the DELTA calculation (our simplification of gradient) and also a simple method
implemented which detects new data from sensors, based on data noise.
As the name Fault Detection and Calibration suggests, in this part the fault
detection algorithms and calibration of the sensors are implemented. In addition to
sensor data, other inputs are the control signals from the Control and data received
from the second ECU via UART. This part of the program starts and stops the
Control and the PULSE GENERATOR.
The Control contains the Complementary filter for the tilt angle calculation
and the tilt and turning regulators. The outputs are the desired duty cycles and
direction values for the power electronics.
The PULSE GENERATOR produces the check signal for the voter. It is placed
in the same main program loop as the rest of the program, which is executed by the
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same interrupt instruction. This connects the generation of the check signal with
the execution of the program.
The UART Rx. and UART Tx. are receiving and decoding, respectively coding
and sending the information between the ECUs that are handled.
5.2 Microcontroller Setting
To be able to use the microcontroller on the ECU, it is necessary to set it and activate
the peripherals first. The initial setting may be comprehensive, so it is facilitated
by the The MPLAB Device Blocks for Simulink toolbox mentioned before.
The basic microcontroller setting is handled by the Microchip Master block.
Inside, the user first chooses the type of microcontroller (µC), for witch the program
is designed. The options in the block change accordingly to the choice made. Among
other things the µC desired speed is set here, by specifying the oscillator used and
by setting the prescaler. The Compiler Options block contains additional settings
for the code generation.
The main loop of the program is set to be executed at every 0.001s. This is
mainly for the check signal generation, and therefore the fast program stop detection
by the voter, and also for the UART communication. On the other hand, the rest
of the program has a sample time of 0.01s.
5.3 Sensor Data Reading
In chapter 4.2, sensor selection is discussed. Data from the chosen IMU are read via
the I2C interface, while potentiometer values are acquired by ADC.
The BUS I2C MASTER block serves to set the I2C peripheral and to compose
the communication protocol. The user chooses the specific I2C module to use and
sets its speed. The special interface of the block then allows the communication
protocol, which is usually specified in the data sheet for the device used, to be
composed quickly.
Before the IMU can be measuring and sending data, it needs to be initialised
and set. This takes place immediately on program startup by the Config IMU block.
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The function inside sets the configuration register inside the IMU, so that the inner
8MHz oscillator is used. The acc and gyro ranges are set as well – the default setting
suits our needs the best, as it is the most sensitive. The ranges set are:
Gyro ±250 ◦/sec
Acc ±2g
The communication protocol (within the BUS I2C MASTER block) for the
IMU data readings is the following:
Initial-Configuration
Start
Write Address:{[0x68]} % Component address
Write Data (x1) Write:{[0x3B]} % Register address
Stop
Start
Write Address:{[0x68]} % Component address
Read Data (x14) Read: {Data}
Stop
At first, the peripheral is initialized by the Initial-Configuration instruction.
This instruction is automatically added at the beginning of all communication
protocols created with this block. The instruction ensures peripheral turn on, sets
the baud rate and relevant pin initialisation. It was reasoned that there may be
other communications on the same peripheral with a different device at a different
speed, justifying this choice.
The Start instruction sends a start condition on the peripheral - initiating the
communication. This is followed by the sending of the device address and register
address, from which the data will be read. Following this the communication is
ended and restarted by the Stop and Start instructions. The address of the device
is sent again, but the following action is to read the data from the previous register
address. The Read Data (x14) instruction reads fourteen 8-bit values and then
communication is ended.
Inside the IMU there is a mechanism which automatically shifts the register
pointer when reading the data. The register addresses are ordered consecutively,
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in order to allow the fast reading of all the data measured at once. This feature
significantly speeds up data reading. A thorough description of the communication
protocol and IMU registers can be found in [11] and [18].
The IMU measures in 16-bit resolution, but only 8-bit values can be sent via
I2C -thus the data needs to be processed before they can be further used in the
program.
Figure 5.2: The IMU readings block contents
In figure 5.2 the IMU data processing is shown. The output vector elements are
processed by a simple function (unnamed blocks) that create a single 16-bit value
from two 8-bits. For the temperature data, the Conversion to ◦C function is added.
An ADC is used for the data readings from the potentiometer. The ADC is set
by the block of the same name from the Microchip toolbox library. Activating the
ADC peripheral is done by including this block and by the choice of appropriate
ADC module. The ADC has a 10-bit resolution for simultaneous data sampling.
Therefore, the signal measured is going to be in the range of < 0; 1023 >.
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5.4 Delta and Noise Detection
The DELTA and Noise detection block contains two functions. The fist function
computes the simplified gradient as a difference between two measured values in
time, called DELTA. The accomplishment of the function in Simulink is very simple
(see fig.: 5.3). The function uses several Unit Delay blocks, which ensure a delay of
the data passing through by one sample. Due to the 0.01s sample time, the produced
DELTA is calculated for the values of 0.1s distance. Because there is a certain noise
in the data measured, it is appropriate to filter the data before the function is used.
Figure 5.3: The DELTA function in Simulink
The Noise detection function (fig.: 5.4), checks whether the data read from the
IMU is changing in time (contains noise).
Figure 5.4: Noise detection realised in Simulink
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The function is, again, very simple, utilising the Unit Delay and Detect Change
blocks. When the actual value differs from the previous one, the output of the Detect
Change is a logical value of 1. If not, the output is 0.
The created function (fig.: 5.4) has a logic output value of 0 when four of
the same consecutive values are received. This might signal either a sensor or
communication peripheral malfunction.
The outputs of these two functions are the inputs for the Fault Detection and
Calibration.
5.5 Fault Detection
The simplest and therefore most commonly used Fault Detection (FD) methods
include the limit checking and signal models (chapter 7 and 8 of [9]). Generally, we
can say that these methods have some kind of threshold. There are several ways to
realise limit checking, for example by checking the absolute signal value, checking
the gradient (first time derivative) or to adjust (or not) the threshold according to
a situation.
From the methods stated in [9], we decided to use standard limit checking
of absolute values and a simplified gradient checking (as an already mentioned
DELTA).
In our software, there are the following FD mechanisms:
• Limit checking for acc, gyro and potentiometer
• DELTA checking for acc and gyro
• Noise detection for acc and gyro
• Calculated duty cycles comparison
• Error information interchange
• Communication bus functionality check
The following sub-subsections describe the used FD algorithms showed in figures
A.1, A.2 and A.3.
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5.5.1 Implementation
The Fault Detection and Calibration is a key part of the program. This part is
realised in Stateflow, which is a Simulink library, and contains data check algorithms,
fault detection algorithms and a decision mechanism to switch off the check signal
generation and therefore to switch off the Control as well (see section 5.8). Inside
there is a state machine shown in fig.:5.5.
Figure 5.5: State machine inside the Fault Detection and Calibration
After the vehicle startup, the program is in the INITIALIZATION state. In
this state the program checks communication with sensors and with the second ECU.
This check lasts for 1s. If the sensor data limits are crossed, or some communication
is not working, the program then enters the INI failed state. In that case the program
shuts off the check signal generation, making the voter disconnect the ECUs from
the power electronics. Due to this, the vehicle then needs to be restarted in order
to operate again. The control mechanisms used in the INITIALISATION state are
also used in the RUN state, where the remaining and above mentioned mechanisms
are added.
In the case that none of the ECUs recognise an error, the program enters the
CALIBRATION state. In this state, it measures the sensor data to adjust the
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algorithms. This process lasts 1s. Due to this calculation, the vehicle should be
held still in a horizontal position after turning on.
After the calibration is done, the program enters the RUN state. The program
stays in this state until turning off. This state features all the fault detection and
system reactions logic. The logic is carried out by several parallel processes.
Acc, Gyro and Potentiometer
The realisation of these sensor checks is shown in figure 5.6. It can be seen that for
the transition from a state when the program doesn’t report an error, to the state
when it does, it is necessary to satisfy one of the conditions. These conditions are
made by thresholds for absolute sensor and for DELTA values.
On the contrary, to switch back to the normal state when the program does not
report an error, it is necessary for the input data to be within all of these limits.
Figure 5.6: Limit and delta checking of acc, gyro and pot implemented in Stateflow
Duty Cycle Comparision
The received duty cycle values (via UART) are compared with the duty cycle values
calculated by the ECU. The information transfer between ECU takes some time and
therefore it is appropriate to hold the calculated data until the new data is received,
before comparing them.
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The implemented algorithm (fig.: A.3) checks whether the compared duty cycles
differ by less than 0.2. Due to the noise of the sensor data, it is necessary to have
several consecutive duty cycle mismatches before an error is reported. Testing on
our system proved that at least 7 such consecutive mismatches are needed in order
to report an error.
UART Error Check
The UART error check is another part of FD. It is located outside the Stateflow
chart (where the main FD algorithms and mechanisms are implemented) in the
UART processing Rx block as it is necessary for it to function to operate at the
same sample time as the UART communication.
This function checks whether the de-packeting function (section 5.6) has found
an End Byte in the received data. If the de-packeting function fails to find the End
Byte for the five consecutive sample times, it changes its logical output value to 1.
Figure 5.7: UART data arrival check
The function is of a simple construction, as shown in fig.: 5.7. The output of
this function then serves as an input for the FD mechanism in Stateflow. In case
of a UART malfunction, the FD mechanism then reacts accordingly to the output
value of this function (see UART FD in fig.: A.2).
Data Change
This FD mechanism changes its states based on the logical output of the Noise
detection function (see 5.4). The mechanism reports an error when the logical
output of the Noise detection for the acc or gyro is 1.
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Mechanism to Stop the Vehicle
This mechanism (fig.: 5.8) ensures triggering the algorithm to stop the vehicle
(mentioned in section 5.7). It is triggered when the second ECU reports an error,
or in the case of a communication bus failure.
The figure shows that the program enters the WARNING state, in which
there is currently no programmed action. This state is ready for future system
enhancements, to produce a warning to the passenger, before the vehicle actually
starts to stop. After this, the program triggers the stopping algorithm and when
this is completed (now set to take 2 seconds) it turns off the check signal.
Figure 5.8: FD mechanism for stopping the vehicle
Software Check Switch Mechanism
The mechanism to decide when to stop check signal generation is a significant part
of the program. As well as for the rest of the mechanisms mentioned, the key part
is the transition condition between its states.
As seen in the figure, the highest priority for switching the states has the STOP
SWCHECK signal, which is generated in the mechanism to stop the vehicle (see fig.:
5.8). The second transition condition is more complicated but the more important.
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Figure 5.9: Mechanism to turn off check signal generation
This transition condition ensures that the mechanism transitions when another
FD algorithm reports an error, but there is no error at the second ECU or bus
malfunction at the same time. In such a case, the Mechanism to Stop the Vehicle
would be given the preference.
5.6 UART Communication
The communication between ECUs is another essential part of the system.
Transmitting and receiving is done by the UART processing Tx resp. UART
processing Rx blocks. Inside, there are functions to packet and de-packet data.
The functions were created by Ing. Josef Vejlupek [19].
The packeting function compiles the data to send into a 13-byte long message
in hexa-notation. The message frame is the following:
Byte 1 : Start byte
Bytes 2-4 : Message header
Bytes 5-8 : Data bytes
Bytes 9-12 : Fletcher’s checksum
Byte 13 : End byte
The de-packeting function then decodes the message, and when it intercepts the
End Byte, it passes the received data to the rest of the program via global variables.
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5.7 Control
Inside the Control there are sensor value conversion functions, the Complementary
filter (see section 2.2.1), the tilt and turning regulators and the H-Bridge controller
which produces the control signals.
Figure 5.10: Vehicle control in Simulink
The basis of the control was already done in previous work during the original
vehicle development. However, some things had to be adjusted for the new system
design. The important new part here is the algorithm to stop the vehicle. It
can be found inside the H-Bridge controller and it is triggered by the vehicle stop
input signal.
Figure 5.11: The growing duty cycle value in Simulink
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The algorithm to stop the vehicle is made as simple as possible (fig.: 5.11).It
takes the form of an enabled subsystem which output is a duty cycle that is
subtracted from the duty cycle produced by regulators. Setting the Constant and
the Discrete-Time Integrator ensures the gradual growth of the subtracted duty
cycle in time and growth time.
This algorithm makes the duty cycle fall to zero, so the vehicle is unable to
drive on. However, it is also unable to balance. A more appropriate solution would
be implementing the state-space control with the velocity regulator: this makes it
easy to reduce the desired velocity to zero, but allows the vehicle to balance at the
same time. However, this is not the goal of this thesis.
5.8 Pulse Generator and Other Minor Program Parts
Check signal generation is provided by the PULSE GENERATOR block. Inside the
block there is a simple function comprised of the Pulse generator and Switch blocks
from the basic Simulink library.
Figure 5.12: Content of the PULSE GENERATOR block
The output is a logical value that changes values every 0.001s. When it comes
to the switch signal from the FD, the Switch changes the output value to a constant
of 0.
In figure A.1, several grey colour blocks with the names of global variables can
be seen. These variables are used to pass their values to other program parts and
are made using the Data Store Memory block.
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The figure also shows that the output PWM control signal on the µC peripherals
is carried out by the Output Compare function. This function is part of the Microchip
library and allows the PWM peripheral to be set easily.
The last thing to explain is the logic to turning on and off of the Control. It
is conducted by two logic functions, which ensure that the Control is active only
in the case that the calibration is done and that there is not a request to stop the
check signal generation.
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Vehicle
To perform a Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) testing of the new system, we needed to
have a suitable mathematical model of the vehicle at our disposal. In this chapter,
two such models of different complexities are described. The unstable balancing
vehicles are usually modelled as inverted pendulums in a two or three dimensional
space. The two-dimensional model is sufficient to our needs here.
6.1 The Simplest Model
The following model was created based on the requirement for simplicity. To
create such model, many physical phenomena had to be omitted. The following
assumptions have been taken:
• The tilt angle is small enough for its trigonometric function linearisation
• The angle between the passenger and the handlebar is constant
• The centre of gravity of the vehicle is in the wheel’s axis of rotation
• The motor inductance has a negligible effect on the response of the motor
6.1.1 Model of a DC Motor
The DC motor model was created first. The mathematical equations describing
the DC motor are widely known today. The DC motor model can be simplified
to a scheme in figure 6.1, where R and L are the motor’s winding inductance and
resistance, u is motor terminals voltage, i is the motor current and ue is inducted
voltage.
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Figure 6.1: DC motor electrical scheme
The equations of the DC motor are the following:
Mi = cφmechi = Kmechi (6.1)
ue = cφelω = Keω (6.2)
u = Ri+ L
di
dt
+ ue (6.3)
Where:
Mi Inducted torque [Nm]
cφmech Motor’s mechanical constant [Nm/A]
cφel Motor’s electrical constant [V s/rad]
ω Motor shaft angular velocity [rad/s]
The above stated assumption that the inductance of the motor winding has a
negligible effect on its response, changes the equation (6.3) as follows.
u = Ri+ ue (6.4)
This simplification can be made as the time constant of the electrical part is
much lower in general than the time constant of the mechanical part.
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6.1.2 Vehicle Model
According to the stated assumptions, the simplest dynamic model of the vehicle is
a simple inverted pendulum with two degrees of freedom, physical construction and
passenger. A scheme of the model is shown in figure 6.2.
ϕ
m
M
Figure 6.2: A scheme of the simplest vehicle model
The dynamic equations around the axis of rotation and in the movement
direction, for this model, are the following:
Iϕ¨ = Mgycg sinϕ−Mx¨ycg cosϕ (6.5)
F = (M +m)x¨ (6.6)
Thence the equations of motion are:
x¨ =
F
(M +m)
(6.7)
ϕ¨ =
Mgycg sinϕ
I
− MFycg cosϕ
I(M +m)
(6.8)
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where
I Inertia of the pendulum (passenger) [kgm2]
ϕ Tilt angle [rad]
ϕ¨ Angular acceleration of the pendulum (passenger) [rad/s2]
M Pendulum weight [kg]
m Vehicle weight [kg]
ycg Passenger center of mass position [m]
x¨ Vehicle forward acceleration [m/s2]
F Force acting on the vehicle [N ]
The linearised state-space model was created from these equations. The model
states need to be known to successfully use the model in simulations. The state
vector was determined as
x = [ϕ; ϕ˙;x; x˙], (6.9)
and then the state-space model was created according to the standard notation
as
x˙ = Ax + Bu (6.10)
where
A =

0 1 0 0
Mgycg/I 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
 , B =

0
−Mycg/(M +m)I
0
1/(M +m)
 , u = F .
The input of the model is a force acting on the vehicle in the axis of its rotation.
This is why the motor torques need to be converted to the acting force before the
model can be used in simulation.
It is clear from the above stated equations that the model omits many effects
and parts, such as frictions, wheels and proper centre of gravity positions. Therefore,
although the model is somewhat far from reality, it can provide a basic insight to
the control problems of inverted pendulums.
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6.2 Advanced Model
The advanced model includes many of the omitted effects in the simplest model.
It follows the same assumptions as the previous model, and with the addition of
a wheel model (fig.:6.3). In order to connect the wheel model with the pendulum
model, the contact forces need to be included for both parts. This vehicle model
uses the motor model from section 6.1.1 as well.
r
x
ϕw
Mi
Mf
mw
Ffs
F1
Fp
Figure 6.3: Free body diagram of forces and torques applied to a wheel
The expression from the equations (6.2) and (6.4) gives the motor current as:
i =
u− ue
R
=
u
R
− Keω
R
. (6.11)
Putting this into equation (6.1) gives the inducted torque as:
Mi = Kmechi =
uKmech
R
− KeωKmech
R
. (6.12)
For a more precise calculation of inducted voltage, we will use
ω = (ωw − ωb), (6.13)
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where ωw is the wheel angular velocity and ωb is the vehicle body angular
velocity. Then the ω is the relative angular velocity between the stator and rotor of
the motor (the stator is connected with the body).
Consequently, the equations of the wheel are:
Iwϕ¨w = Mi −Mf − rFfs (6.14)
mwx¨w = Ffs − F1 (6.15)
where the friction torque is calculated as
Mf = b
(
ϕ˙− x˙
r
)
. (6.16)
We assume that there is no slipping between the wheel and surface. Therefore
we can express the wheel position according to its rotation as
xw = ϕwr. (6.17)
By putting the equation (6.12) into the eq.(6.14) we get the unknown friction
force as
Ffs =
−Iwϕ¨w −Mf
r
+
Kmechu−KeKmech(ωw − ωb)
rR
, (6.18)
where
Iw Wheel inertia [kgm
2]
ϕ¨w Wheel angular acceleration [rad/s
2]
Mf Friction torque [Nm]
r Wheel radius [m]
Ffs Static friction force [N ]
mw Wheel mass [kg]
x¨ Wheel forward acceleration [m/s2]
F1 Contact force between the wheel and body [N ]
b Viscose friction coefficient [Nms/rad]
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The free body diagram of the inverted pendulum for this model is shown in
figure 6.4. We consider the vehicle body as attached to two wheels, on which the
reaction and friction forces have the same size. The 1 and 2 indexes mark the left
and right wheel effects.
ϕb
mbg
mbLϕ¨b
2Mi
L
2Mf
F1+2
2Fp
Figure 6.4: Passenger and handle modelled as an inverted pendulum
The equations of motion of the inverted pendulum are given by:
Ibϕ¨b = 2FpL sinϕb + 2Mf − 2Mi − (F1 + F2)L cosϕb, (6.19)
mbx¨b = (F1 + F2)−mbLϕ¨b cosϕb. (6.20)
The forward movement can be stated as:
mbx¨b cosϕb = (F1 + F2) cosϕb −mbLϕ¨b − 2Fp sinϕb +mbg sinϕ. (6.21)
We can see that both parts of the model are connected by the reaction forces F1
and F2. We can express those forces from eq.(6.20) and putting them into eq.(6.15)
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and (6.18), which gives us the forces as
mbx¨b +mbLϕ¨b cosϕb =
2
[
− (mw + Iw
r2
)x¨w − KeKmech
r2R
x˙w +
KeKmech
rR
ϕ˙b+
Kmech
rR
u− Mi
r
]
(6.22)
Now, we can substitute equation (6.19) into eq.(6.21) and express the torque
equilibrium in the axis of rotation as
(Ib +mbL
2)ϕ¨b = mbgL sinϕ+ 2Mf − 2Mi −mbx¨bL cosϕb. (6.23)
Although this vehicle model is more advanced than the simplest one, even here
we must simplify and omit some phenomena. The model is again linearised and put
into state-space assuming small tilt angles. Another simplification is considering
the vehicle translation as a whole, thereby substituting the x¨b and x¨w variables by
a single x¨.
The state-space model was created as:
x˙ = Ax + Bu
y = Cx + Du
where
x = [x; x˙;ϕ; ϕ˙]. (6.24)
The elements in matrix C are chosen according to what states we want to observe
and the matrix D is a column vector of zeros. The system matrices are the following:
A =

0 1 0 0
0 α β −rα
0 0 0 1
0 γ δ −rγ
 , B =

0
α
0
γ
,
where
α =
2(Rb−KeKmech)(mbL2 +mbrL+ Ib)
2R(IbIw + IwL2mb + Ibmwr2 + L2mbmwr2) +RIbmbr2
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β =
−L2m2bgr2
Ib(2Iw +mbr2 + 2mwr2) + 2IwL2mb + 2L2mbmwr2
γ =
−2(Rb−KeKmech)(2Iw +mbr2 + 2mwr2 + Lmbr)
2Rr(IbIw + IwL2mb + Ibmwr2 + L2mbmwr2) +RIbmbr3
δ =
Lmbg(2Iw +mbr
2 + 2mwr
2)
2IbIw + 2IwL2mb + Ibmbr2 + 2Ibmwr2 + 2L2mbmwr2
 =
Kmechr
Rb−KeKmech .
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7 Testing of the New Control
System
Before the new control system can be mounted to the vehicle it is necessary to test its
functionality. Thanks to modern simulation and modelling tools, this practice has
become an integral part of product development, especially in the automotive and
aerospace industries. Proper simulation tools are absolutely essential, mainly for
products where incorrect functionality might cause high financial losses or health
risks. These tools also rapidly reduce the cost and time requirements of product
development.
7.1 HIL - Hardware In the Loop
HIL - Hardware In the Loop is a method for the real-time testing of developed control
systems. Special hardware is necessary to perform HIL - it is a real-time computer
with many input/output (I/O) peripherals through which the tested control system
is connected. The scheme of HIL hardware and tested control system connection is
shown in figure 7.1.
Actuators model
Controled system
model
Sensors model
RT
hardware
Tested control system
User InterfacePC
Figure 7.1: HIL simulator structure
57
7.2: Our HIL Realisation
Mathematical models of the system, which the tested control system should
work with, are loaded into the real-time computer. The user can interact with
the simulation through a software interface running on a normal PC. The PC is
connected with the HIL hardware, usually by Ethernet cable.
This interaction capability allows the user to manually or automatically
simulate different operating conditions of the controlled system. It also allows
logging of I/O and simulated variables.
7.2 Our HIL Realisation
We have the dSPACE ds1103 [20] available in MechLab. It contains a real-time
processor and a large amount of I/O peripherals. It is connected to a PC by an
Ethernet cable and can be approached through the Control Desk software interface.
Models of the simulated systems are created in Simulink and then loaded
to dSPACE. It is necessary to have the dSPACE supplementary library installed
in Simulink, as the library contains blocks/functions to link the model with the
hardware peripherals. For the proper compilation of the model into dSPACE, the
correct .tlc file is needed as well.
All the files used are enclosed on a CD with the thesis.
7.2.1 Creation of the Model for dSPACE
The vehicle model in Simulink suitable to be used with dSPACE had to be created
first. The simplest model (described in 6.1) was used at first. Due to the size of the
whole Simulink model, it is enclosed in appendix, figure A.4.
State-space models are created very easily in Simulink, using theState Space
block, to which the user enters the names of system matrices prepared and loaded
in the MATLAB workspace. We loaded the system model into workspace using .m
script.
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Figure 7.2: Simple DC motor model in Simulink
Because the simplest vehicle model does not integrate the DC motors,
they have to be modelled separately. The DC motor model, according
to equation (6.4), is shown in figure 7.2. In the model k = 9 is a
motor gear ratio and r wheel is wheel radius. The motor parameters are:
R = 0.77Ω; Ke = 0.12404V s/rad; Kmech = 0.1033Nm/A . The rest of the
parameters used for the model are stated in table 7.1.
Figure 7.3: Vehicle and two DC motors modelled in Simulink
Figure 7.3 shows a part of the model for dSPACE, which includes the DC motor
models, value conversions and the vehicle state-space model. The input of the DC
motor models is applied voltage, which is created by sensing the control outputs of
the control system. The sensing of the control outputs is provided by special blocks
(see figure 7.4).
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Figure 7.4: Control outputs sensing
These blocks (blue) can be found in the dSPACE supplementary library in the
Simulink menu. The input PWM peripheral of dSPACE is used to read the duty
cycle values. The block which handles the peripheral can read the duty cycle and
the period length of the incoming PWM signal. We need only the duty cycle for our
purposes.
The BIT IN Chennelwise block reads a digital value on a specified input pin.
The value read is a DIR that specifies the polarity of the voltage applied to the
motors. Our vehicle uses 3× 12V batteries, so the simulated voltage for the motor
can be 36V or −36V . The Switch block decides which polarity is applied based on
the DIR values. The voltage is then multiplied by the read duty cycle and applied
to the motors.
Another important part is the feedback for the tested control system - sensors
models. In our system, we use IMUs that communicates via I2C interface. One way
to provide feedback is to fully emulate the I2C communication protocol as it would
be the same IMU. However, that would be significantly time-consuming. Therefore,
the feedback is carried out using analogue peripherals (shown in fig.: 7.5).
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Figure 7.5: Signals adjustment for DAC
The DAC Chennelwise block provides access to a Digital-to-Analogue Converter
(DAC) handling an analogue peripheral. This block accepts the values from a 0 to
1 range. Therefore, it is necessary to adjust the signal to it. The states from the
state-space model, which are sensed by the sensors, are saturated at first. Following
this, their values are shifted up by the upper saturation value and divided by their
range (twice the upper limit). This adjustment ensures the correct representation of
the values - zero in the model will be a half of the analogue output reference voltage,
the maximum negative value will be zero voltage and the maximum positive value
will be the reference voltage.
The parameters of the system used in the model are shown in the following
table.
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
M 70 kg m 10 kg l 1 m
g 9.81 m/s2 I 67.2 kgm2 rwheel 0.15 m
Table 7.1: Vehicle parameters used in the model
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7.2.2 Regulator Tuning
The next step was to tune the tilt regulator inside the ECU for the simulated
model parameters. Rapid Control Prototyping proved its strength here. Because
the program for the ECUs was developed in Simulink, as well as the model of the
vehicle, the regulator could be tuned really quickly - fully in simulation. It took
only a few simple adjustments.
The final form of the model for the regulator tuning is shown in fig.: 7.6. In
the Control block, there is the control as described in 5.7, but without the turning
regulator. The Vehicle model block contains the model shown in fig.: 7.3.
The rest of the blocks in the figure below are for the analogue signal transfer
simulation. At first, the model output values are adjusted for the DAC, as described
in the section above, and then converted in the same manner as when decoded by a
10-bit ADC on the ECU peripheral. The Rate Transition blocks serve to separate
different sample times of the control and vehicle model.
Figure 7.6: Simulink model for the tilt regulator tuning
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7.2.3 Test Kit
By the time everything was ready to perform HIL testing, the new electronics had
yet to be produced. Therefore, a test kit, where the developed algorithms were
tested and debugged, was assembled (see fig.:A.7).
The ECU for the test kit was made using the dsPIC33FJ12MC804 µC, which
is available together with its connector board in MechLab. The voter was made
by using the already mentioned Cool Runner II Starter Kit, which program was
already done. The program for the ECU was adjusted for use with this µC type.
The receiving of sensor data was modified to use ADC, because of the analogue
signal usage.
Furthermore, the corresponding signals were linked between ECUs and
with dSPACE as they should be. For proper functionality, the grounds were
interconnected as well. It was also necessary to bring the voltage reference for the
dSPACE DAC to the appropriate input pin. A thorough description of dSPACE
peripheral commissioning can be found in the hardware manual.
7.2.4 HIL on the New Hardware
When the new system electronics was prepared, HIL testing could be performed.
The final programs were loaded onto the ECUs and to the voter, and the system
was interconnected with dSPACE (fig.:A.8). The advanced mathematical model
was loaded to dSPACE, also using the analogue signals for sensor outputs. A user
interface was created in the Control Desk (fig.:A.6). Inside the interface, we observed
the measured and simulated values and then saved the data in a .mat file. This
stored results of the HIL were loaded into MATLAB and appropriately rendered.
More than 30 tests with different simulated malfunctions were performed.
The tests included several sensor failure types, on both high and low velocities,
communication bus failure tests and ECU failure tests. All the developed FD
algorithms and mechanisms were tested for reactions. The goal was to prove that
the designed control system reacts as intended, which was achieved successfully. All
the measured data and models used are enclosed on a CD with this thesis.
Unfortunately, it was impossible to fit all of the tests into this thesis, and
therefore only some of the tests are described in the following sub-subsections.
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Initialisation Test
Description: After switching on the vehicle, the ECUs start the initialization. In
this phase they don’t produce control signals and the voter waits. In case of an
unsuccessful initialization, the ECUs won’t generate the check signal and the voter
will disconnect both ECUs from the power electronics (see state machine inside the
voter in fig.: 4.4). Therefore, the vehicle is unable to ride and must be restarted.
Parameters: The output acc signal of the simulated model was adjusted to produce
0 voltage - ie. the sensor measures maximum negative value.
Results: The test results are shown in fig.: 7.7. In this figure, we can see that
the control system didn’t produce the control outputs and therefore no voltage was
applied to the motors.
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Figure 7.7: HIL initialisation test results
This happened because the FD algorithm found the fault and switched off the
check signal generation. Therefore, the Control stayed turned off and the voter
disconnected the ECUs from the power electronics (sub-chart 3, time 4s).
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Gyro Failure at Low Velocity
Description: Initialisation was carried out successfully, as well as calibration, and
the vehicle is in operation. In the case that a sensor fails, or it’s mechanically
damaged, this may lead to its output saturation to the maximum value.
Parameters: The gyro signal is saturated to the maximum value after a given time,
at low vehicle velocity.
Results: Figure 7.8 shows that after initialisation and calibration, the voter routes
the control outputs from the first ECU. Approximately at 9s the sudden gyro signal
saturation occurs - only for the currently routed ECU. We can see that the duty
cycle rises to the maximum for a split second. This causes a little acceleration of
the vehicle as can be seen from its angular velocity in sub-chart 1.
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Figure 7.8: HIL gyro failure test results
However, the FD recognizes the fault, the check signal from the first ECU is
shut down and the voter switches. The second ECU then stopped the vehicle - by
gradually limiting the duty cycle and then shut down the check signal as well. The
voter disconnected both ECUs from the power electronics at time 14s.
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Acc Failure at High Velocity
Description: The vehicle operates for some time and gained some velocity. This
failure is similar to the previous test, but this time the acc is tested.
Parameters: The acc signal is saturated to its minimal value after a given time,
at high vehicle velocity.
Results: Test results are shown in fig.: 7.9. We can see that the duty cycle is
not zero in time 0s because the vehicle already had some velocity. The acc failure
occurred between 9s and 10s. The reactions of the control system are the same
as in the previous test: the FD recognized the fault, the voter switched almost
immediately and the vehicle was controlled for a while by the second ECU before
it stopped. This was the time where the control system should warn the passenger
that the vehicle is going to stop.
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Figure 7.9: HIL acc failure test results
We can see in sub-chart 1 that the tilt angle of the vehicle was raised before the
duty cycle reaches 0. This was caused by the fact that the simulated model didn’t
include any possible action of the passenger.
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UART Failure
Description: The communication bus is essential for the control system to operate.
If the communication is lost the system loses the ability to interchange information
between ECUs.
Parameters: In time 14s, one line of UART communication bus is manually driven
to the ground.
Results: We can see from the results that when the communication is lost, both
ECUs continue to generate the check signal. The ECU that registered the UART
malfunction changes the error register value, therefore informing the second ECU
via the remaining bus line. Both ECUs react by triggering the algorithm for stopping
the vehicle.
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Figure 7.10: HIL UART failure test results
In cases where both bus lines would fail to operate, the fault would be registered
as well as for the one line failure. Both ECUs would trigger the algorithm to stop
the vehicle.
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8 Conclusion
This thesis introduces the design of a new, fault-tolerant control system for a
self-balancing two-wheel vehicle. The thesis was made in cooperation with Bc.
Michal Bastl, who, in his thesis, focuses on the development of new, safer electronics
for the vehicle. Both theses build on a previous student’s project in which the vehicle
was developed.
The first goal of the thesis was to perform an analysis of possible risks of the
previous vehicle system, to assess these risks and to suggest possible measures to
reduce them. At first, the original vehicle system condition is briefly stated and
some obvious insufficiencies are pointed out; followed by a thorough FMEA and
FRPN calculation where the risks of the system are evaluated.
Based on these findings, new safety measures are suggested. Another FMEA
was performed on the imaginary enhanced system with the applied safety measures
for results comparison. It was proven that applying the measures significantly
reduces the risks to most system components.
Another goal was to design a new redundant system topology. The system,
consisting of two independent ECUs, was designed. Each ECU has its own redundant
sensors. The control outputs of the ECUs are connected to the voter. The voter is
realised using a CPLD chip and it provides the control outputs connection to the
power electronics, as well as containing a logic to rapidly switch between the applied
outputs. These system parts are galvanically isolated.
At the same time, the system’s reaction mechanisms needed to be developed,
in addition to the software that ensures them. The developed software contains
algorithms which, in case of malfunction, recognise the fault - either safely stopping
the vehicle or disconnecting the control from the power electronics.
The following goal was to perform HIL tests to verify the system’s reactions.
To perform the HIL, two mathematical models of the vehicle with different
complexities were created. Initially the regulator in the control algorithm was
tuned fully in simulation, using the less complex mathematical model of the vehicle.
Subsequently, the system was assembled according to the new topology, utilising the
microcontrollers available in our laboratory. During HIL testing on this assembly,
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several software flaws were debugged and the software was enhanced to its final
version.
As soon as the new electronics of the system, designed by Bc. Michal Bastl,
were completed, a series of HIL tests were performed on it, using the advanced
mathematical model. These tests proved the reliability of the new control system
and that it reacts to faults as intended.
Using the developed control system on the vehicle will significantly increase its
safety and reliability.
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